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Introduction and summary
The last decade has witnessed an unprecedented pace
of bank mergers and acquisitions. Between 1990 and
1998, the number averaged about 510 per year com-
pared with 345 per year over the 198089 period. As
a result of this activity, the number of banks operating
in the U.S. has declined about 30 percent since 1990.
In this article, we examine the primary motivations
for this massive wave of bank mergers during the
1990s by analyzing the market prices of these mergers.
A better understanding of the factors that determine
market prices for bank mergers will shed some light
on the implications of continuing mergers and acqui-
sitions in the banking industry. We recognize that
rapidly changing supply and demand conditions are
fundamental to understanding what drives bank
merger markets. For example, bank mergers may be
driven by a desire to reduce overall risk by diversifying
into new geographic or product markets. Additional-
ly, bank mergers may be motivated by a strategic
decision to exploit economies of scale, or to cut over-
head and eliminate duplication by closing branches,
or to achieve synergies through economies of scope.
Of course, bank mergers may also be an attempt by
banks to simply increase their market power or to
quickly grow into superregional or money center banks.
To some extent, each of these motivations, and
resultant strategies, became more feasible in the 1990s
with the relaxing of state and federal restrictions
on banks activities. For example, the RiegleNeal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994 allowed banks to branch interstate by consoli-
dating existing out-of-state bank subsidiaries or by
acquiring banks or individual branches through
mergers and acquisitions. Prior to the RiegleNeal
Act, federal and state laws prevented banks from
expanding across state lines (with some exceptions).1
The RiegleNeal Act allowed bank holding companies
to acquire banks in any state, effective September
29, 1995, and allowed mergers between banks lo-
cated in different states beginning June 1, 1997.2
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton
signed the Financial Services Modernization Act
(GrammLeachBliley Act of 1999), allowing
banks to merge with securities firms and insurance
companies within financial holding companies.
This will further expand the merger opportunities
for banking organizations and may lead to a new
wave of consolidation in banking and other sectors
of the financial services industry.
Another potential regulatory effect on bank
merger trends is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991.
FDICIA introduced mandatory procedures called
prompt corrective actions (PCA), which require
regulators to promptly close depository institutions
when their capital falls below predetermined
quantitative standards, thus eliminating the possi-
bility of regulators providing special consideration
to large banks because of the possible systemic
impact of large bank failure. Therefore, the notion
of too-big-to-fail should be less relevant since
FDICIA. However, an increase of megamergers
has been noticeable in the mid- to late-1990s.3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Some research suggests that too-big-to-fail may have
been one of the reasons for the rise in megamergers
in the 1990s (see Kane, 1998). This is an important
policy issue because previous research raises the pos-
sibility that banking organizations seek to become
larger to increase the probability that the FDIC will
cover 100 percent of their deposits. While most of
the mergers between large publicly traded banks in
the early and mid-1980s were not due to attempts to
exploit deposit insurance, the too-big-to-fail consid-
eration may have been important in megamergers of
the 1990s (Benston, Hunter, and Wall, 1995; Hunter
and Wall, 1989; and Boyd and Graham, 1991).3 In
this article, we examine the distinguishing character-
istics of these megamergers.
Obviously, merger prices play an important role
in the rise in bank mergers in the last decade. We
analyze two types of prices commonly employed by
both regulators and analysts: the merger bid premiums
offered for a target bank, defined as the ratio of the
market price offered for the target to the book value
of equity of the target bank, and the excess stock
returns earned by shareholders of the target bank
around the merger announcement date.
We examine whether prices offered to target banks
have been increasing over time. Increased prices would
tend to make bank owners more willing to sell. There
are theoretical reasons why prices must either increase
or decrease as restrictions on expansion are reduced
(Adkisson and Fraser, 1990). First, prior to Riegle
Neal, the number of potential bidders for a given target
bank was limited by laws governing intrastate and
interstate acquisitions. The removal of these restric-
tions should increase the demand for target banks as
the number of potential bidders increases, resulting in
higher acquisition prices. Thus, higher prices should
be observed in the post-RiegleNeal environment.
Alternatively, acquisition prices could be lower
when restrictions are removed. Restrictions on geo-
graphical expansion form a barrier to entry that pro-
vides a bank with a protected niche and permits it to
earn excess profits. These excess profits become part
of the price in merger negotiations. Decreasing the
barriers to entry reduces the excess profits and thereby
lowers merger prices. By ensuring that they earn
only normal profits, lowering the barriers to entry
may increase substitutability among target banks, en-
largingfrom the acquirers perspectivethe effective
supply of alternatives. Under the barriers to entry
hypothesis, lower prices should be observed in the
post-RiegleNeal environment.
During the late 1970s and 1980s, individual states
took steps, as permitted by the Douglas Amendment
to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, to allow
acquisition of banks in their states by bank holding
companies headquartered in other states. The Bank
Holding Company Act permitted multibank holding
companies to acquire bank subsidiaries only to the
extent allowed by the laws of the state in which the
proposed target bank resided. Many states allowed
acquisition by holding companies headquartered in
only a limited number of states. Other states allowed
entry from all states.
States in several regions developed formal com-
pacts or treaties to allow entry from states in the re-
gion. The states in the Southeast formed the most
cohesive unit, generally allowing entry from other
states in the region and excluding entry from states
outside the region (Savage, 1993). We use a South-
east indicator to test whether target banks in the
Southeast received higher bid premiums than banks
in other parts of the country.
In addition to examining how bank merger prices
have changed over the 1990s and whether target
banks in the Southeast receive higher bid premiums
than other banks, we determine how prices are corre-
lated with the financial characteristics of target banks
and their market structure. As with any investment,
the target banks value to the acquiring bank should
reflect its present discounted value of future net cash
flows. At a minimum, the bid price should reflect the
stand-alone value of the net assets of the target bank
and the net cash flows from higher-valued deposit
insurance as a result of the proposed merger.
Market structure, consisting of the number, size
distribution, and market share of banks, influences the
degree of competition and, thus, determines a banks
profitability. An often used measure of the degree of
competition in banking markets is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by add-
ing together the squares of the deposit shares of partic-
ipants in a banking market and multiplying by 10,000.
This index equals 10,000 for a monopoly market, and
takes on lower values as more banks enter the market.
For example, if there are five firms in a market and
their deposit shares are 20 percent each, the HHI
would be computed as follows: [(.2)2 + (.2)2 + (.2)2 +
(.2)2 + (.2)2 ] ´ 10,000 = 2,000. Antitrust regulators
use this measure to screen bank merger applications
for potential anticompetitive effects.
In theory, target banks in markets with relatively
high HHIs and, thus, operating in less competitive
markets tend to receive high bid offers. A factor
counterbalancing this tendency is the bank merger
review process enforcing the U.S. Department of
Justices (DOJ) merger guidelines. This review4 Economic Perspectives
process could result in divestitures of banking offices
as a condition of approval. Thus, the price an acquirer
is willing to pay for a target bank should reflect the
probable reaction of the antitrust authorities. If the
merger review process works well, participating in
a merger does not give banks greater market power.
One way to analyze the effectiveness of the process
is to determine the effects of market concentration
|on bid premiums. Bid premiums should be higher
for targets in more concentrated markets.
We find a variety of interesting and important
results. We find that higher performing targets, as
measured by both return on equity and return on assets,
receive higher bids. We also find that the lower the
capital-to-deposit ratio, the larger the bid the acquir-
ing bank is willing to offer. This may be because the
target bank is funding its assets with relatively cheap
funds. Additionally, we find that larger targets loan-
to-assets ratios are correlated with larger bid premiums,
although this effect is not statistically significant.
Bank size is positively related to bid premiums. Market
concentration is not significantly correlated with bid
premiums, reflecting the difficulties of applying our
measure of concentration to banking organizations
whose geographic scope and product mix may be
broader than the local market area.
Prior to RiegleNeal, prices paid for target banks
in the Southeast regional compact tended to be higher
than in other areas, perhaps reflecting the barrier to
entry that provides the target in that region with a
protected niche and permits it to earn excess profits.
After RiegleNeal, the Southeast effect was not sig-
nificant. Overall, however, the price for target banks
tends to be larger during the post-RiegleNeal period,
possibly because of the increase in the actual or poten-
tial number of bidders. Because RiegleNeal provides
increased interstate branching and banking opportu-
nities, the demand for targets should increase as the
universe of bidders increases, resulting in higher
acquisition prices. Thus, we observe higher prices
in the post-RiegleNeal environment.
To get a better sense of how bank mergers are
priced, we use daily stock return data to examine the
stock market reaction to news of an announced merger.
Results of this test are especially useful to interpret
the wave of large bank mergers. If banks are using
their increased freedom to merge in a way intended
to increase the value of their deposit insurance, then
megamergers should generate high bid premiums
and, thus, greater than expected stock market returns
than other types of mergers. However, bank managers
may also pursue mergers to enhance their salary, per-
quisites, and personal prestige. As a result, high bid
premiums for large banking organizations may be
related to several different motivations, many of
which will tend to lead to high merger prices.
A countervailing factor in large bank mergers,
however, is the difficulty of merging two large bank-
ing organization or two organizations of equal size.
According to organization theorists, melding cultures
in a merger is more difficult and costly when the
target is closer in size to the acquirer. If the short-
run costs are a positive function of size and these
costs outweigh the value of increased access to de-
posit insurance, then we would expect to see an in-
verse relationship between size and merger prices
(Benston, Hunter, and Wall, 1995). Our stock return
results suggest that the stock market views large bank
mergers more favorably than small bank mergers.
The unexpected stock returns for large bank targets
are more than double those of small targets.
Our results suggest that changes in state and fed-
eral banking regulations have a significant impact on
bank merger activity in general, and bank merger
prices in particular. Furthermore, by restricting the
types of merger transactions that can take place, state
and federal interstate and intrastate banking laws may
have had unintended consequences. Because restric-
tions on geographical expansion form a barrier to
entry that provides a bank with a protected market
and permits it to earn excess profits, we observe
higher bid premiums in Southeast compact states rel-
ative to other parts of the country. Once these restric-
tions were removed with the passage of RiegleNeal
in 1994, bid premiums were no longer higher in the
Southeast states than in other states. However, they
rose overall relative to the pre-RiegleNeal period.
Thus, our results show how federal and state regula-
tory policies that restrict interstate branching and
banking may produce very different (and distorted)
merger prices relative to policies that are less restric-
tive and market driven.
Finally, our results provide empirical evidence
that when target banks are large, but not megamerg-
ers of equals, there is a greater stock market reaction
to the merger announcement than for other target banks.
This is consistent with the notion that large banks are
using their increased freedom to merge in a way intend-
ed to increase the value of their deposit insurance.
A partial explanation for the recent wave of mergers,
especially megamergers, may be the desire of merging
institutions to obtain a size level sufficient to place
them in the too-big-to-fail category. This is an impor-
tant issue for policymakers, who are concerned about
controlling bank risk-taking propensities and minimiz-
ing the loss exposure of the federal deposit insurance
funds. Thus, size is important in merger decisions5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
TABLE 1
Size distribution of commercial banks
Number Percent Cumulative
Asset size ($ millions) of banks of banks percent Percent Cumulative
A. December 31, 1980
Less than 25 7,233 49 49 5 4
25–50 3,566 24 73 6 11
50–100 2,048 14 87 7 18
100–500 1,496 10 97 15 33
500–1,000 195 1 98 7 40
1,000–5,000 192 1 99 19 59
5,000–10,000 21 – 99 7 66
10,000 or more 18 – 100 34 100
Total 14,769 100
B. December 31, 1998a
Less than 25 3,156 36 36 3 3
25–50 2,261 26 62 5 8
50–100 1,700 19 81 7 15
100–500 1,279 15 96 14 29
500–1,000 149 2 98 6 35
1,000–5,000 114 1 99 15 50
5,000–10,000 20 – 99 8 58
10,000 or more 25 – 100 42 100
Total 8,704 100
aAdjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (all items, 1982–84 = 100).
Note: Numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Quarterly Reports of Condition and Income.
Total assets
because larger institutions may have increased
access to deposit insurance. This greater ac-
cess tends to be reflected in the stock market




Figure 1 shows that the number of
banking organizations in the U.S. has
decreased by about 40 percent since 1980.
This decline is related to the surge in the
number of bank mergers225 per year
during the early 1980s compared with 580
per year during the late 1990s. The share
of domestic deposits held by the nations
ten largest commercial banks nearly dou-
bled from about 19 percent in 1980 to 37
percent in 1998 (DeYoung, 1999). Table 1
provides further evidence of the consolida-
tion trend in banking, which has occurred contempo-
raneously with the reduction in restrictions on
interstate banking and branching.
As mentioned earlier, under RiegleNeal, banks
have been permitted to engage in nationwide branch
banking since June 1, 1997. This liberalization made6 Economic Perspectives
possible the merger of large banking organizations to
create true nationwide banking in the U.S.
However, RiegleNeal was only the final piece
of legislation in a long line of banking deregulation
at the state level. Historically, restrictions on banks
ability to expand geographically have been among the
primary determinants of the structure of commercial
banking in the U.S (Frieder, 1988; and Cornett and
De, 1991a). Concerns about undue concentration of
banking resources and that banks might exercise their
market power by setting high prices and restricting
service led to the imposition of restrictions at both
the state and national levels. The McFadden Act of
1927 restricted nationally chartered banks branching
ability to the same extent allowed to state-chartered
banks. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 pre-
vented multibank holding companies (MBHCs) from
acquiring existing banks or chartering new banks in
states other than their home state. The Douglas
Amendment of the 1956 act allowed MBHCs to acquire
banks only to the extent permitted by the laws of the
state of the target bank. Even the RiegleNeal Act
limits the market share that a banking organization
can hold nationwide or in any given state. The act
established a 10 percent nationwide deposit concentra-
tion limit on organizations making interstate acquisi-
tions and a uniform 30 percent statewide limit (unless
a state chooses a different limit).
The first state statutes permitting entry to out-of-
state MBHCs in accordance with the Douglas Amend-
ment were enacted in 1975 and 1982 by Maine and
Alaska, respectively. By the late 1980s, 41 states
and the District of Columbia had passed similar laws
(Amel, 1986; Frieder, 1988; and Cornett and De,
1991a). Moreover, several states formed reciprocal
regional banking pacts to allow banks in pact states
to acquire targets in other pact states. For example,
prior to the RiegleNeal Act, Wisconsins regional
reciprocal law allowed entry by acquisition for
banking organizations from Illinois, Iowa, Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and Ohio
as long as those states allowed acquisitions by
Wisconsin banks in their markets (Saunders, 1997).
Antitrust statutes and authorities
The federal statutes that govern bank mergers
are the Bank Holding Company Act, the Bank Merger
Act of 1960, and section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914.
The DOJ has general enforcement authority over all
merger and acquisition activities and has established
basic guidelines to cover the evaluation of competitive
issues (Jackson, 1992; and Kwast, Starr-McCluer,
and Wolken, 1997). Box 1 provides a discussion of
the antitrust legal standards.
Under the Bank Merger Act the three federal
regulatory agenciesthe Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC)are required to take
into account the competitive effects of a proposed
merger. The agency to which a merger application
should be submitted depends on the resultant bank-
ing organization. If the resultant banking organization
is a nonmember federally insured bank, the application
needs to be made to the FDIC. If the resultant banking
organization is a state member bank, the application
needs to be made to the appropriate Federal Reserve
Bank, and if it is a national bank, the merger application
should be made to the OCC. In addition to the powers
provided in the Bank Merger Act, the Federal Reserve
System derives its legal authority over bank mergers
from the Bank Holding Company Act, which prohib-
its a bank holding company from acquiring a bank
unless the bank holding company has received prior
approval from the Federal Reserve System. The DOJ
may prevent consummation of the merger within 30
days of the approval from the relevant federal agency.
After this 30-day period, the merger is immune from
the DOJ and other private party litigation.
Antitrust guidelines
The regulators have adopted the DOJs numerical
criteria for assessing the impact of a merger or acquisi-
tion on competition. These criteria, first issued in
1968, were updated in June 1982 based on the HHI.
In evaluating a merger application, antitrust authori-
ties consider both the level of post-merger HHI and
the change in the HHI resulting from the proposed
transaction (see table 2).4 If the post-merger market
HHI is lower than 1,800 points, or the increase in the
index from the pre-merger situation is less than 200
points (or 50 points in industries other than banking),5
the merger is presumed to have no anticompetitive
effects and is generally approved by regulators. The
Federal Reserve uses the acquiring firms market
share as an additional merger screen. A merger is
likely to raise concerns if the acquirers pro forma
market share exceeds 35 percent.
When a merger application violates the guidelines,
regulators consider mitigating factors that would off-
set the anticompetitive effects of the proposed trans-
action. These factors include competitive viability of
the target, presence of active competition from thrifts
and other financial institutions in the market, compe-
tition from out-of-market financial institutions, and
market attractiveness. These factors are weighted
against the increase in concentration. If the increase
in concentration is too large to be justified by mitigating7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1
Antitrust legal standards
The major antitrust concern of each of the fed-
eral bank regulatory authorities is the competitive
effect of mergers and acquisitions. An examination
of this issue requires a clear and concise definition
of the product and geographical markets in which
competition takes place and a standard to measure
the competitive effects of each merger (see Jackson,
1992). This framework was not specifically stated
in the federal statutes that govern mergers. Instead,
it has evolved from three Supreme Court decisions
in the 1960s and 1970s: United States vs. Philadelphia
National Bank (1963), United States vs. Phillipsburg
National Bank and Trust (1970), and United States
vs. Connecticut National Bank (1974).1
In the Philadelphia National Bank case, the
Supreme Court:
n provided the principles by which product and
geographic markets should be defined to assess
the probable competitive effects of a bank merger
or acquisition, and
n noted that commercial banks are unique among
financial institutions (including thrifts) in that
they alone are permitted by law to accept demand
deposits and operate with the benefit of federal
deposit insurance.
The court ruled that the relevant product market
was the cluster of commercial banking services
differentiating commercial banking as a unique line
of business. Thus, only competing commercial
banks were included in the framework for the pur-
poses of analyzing a proposed bank merger under
the Clayton Act. The exact definition of cluster was
not specifically stated in the courts decision. How-
ever, antitrust regulators have used total deposits as
a proxy for the ability of commercial banking orga-
nizations to provide the cluster of banking services
to both businesses and households in a given local
banking market (Rhoades, 1987).
In the Philadelphia National Bank case, the
court noted that the appropriate geographical market
for competitive analysis does not depend on where
the parties to a merger do business or compete.
Instead, it depends on the geographical structure
of the suppliercustomer relationships and where a
purchaser of products and services can practicably
turn for alternative banking services. The court
found that convenience of location is essential to
effective competition, suggesting that geographical
markets for commercial banking are generally con-
sidered to be local, for example, within counties or
metropolitan statistical areas (Holder, 1993).
In the Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust
case (1970), the Supreme Court held that:
n for the purposes of analyzing a proposed merger
under the Clayton Act, regulators should con-
sider both the level of concentration and the
change in concentration of firms in the appro-
priate geographical market, and
n a merger application may be accepted if it can
be shown that the transaction provides substan-
tial public benefits even though it may violate
antitrust guidelines.
The structureconductperformance paradigm
suggests that market concentration beyond a certain
point will likely lead to collusive or monopolistic
behavior by banks, a direct violation of the Clayton
Act. Banking regulators have thus focused on the
anticompetitive issues of bank mergers and acqui-
sitions in terms of the resultant effects on market
concentration (Rhoades, 1987).
In the Connecticut National Bank case, the
Supreme Court:
n  revisited the geographical market definition
and ruled that the relevant banking market is
not a state but rather a segmented group of bank
office areas where a bank would seek business
and, as a practical matter, most of its customers
would do their banking, and
n concluded that thrift institutions should not be
factored into antitrust analysis, but acknowl-
edged that they may be included when and if
saving banks become significant participants
in the marketing of bank services to commercial
enterprises.
These three court decisions provide the funda-
mental concepts for analyzing competitive effects
of bank mergers and acquisitions. In particular, they
hold that 1) the cluster of bank products is the
relevant product line for competitive analysis; 2)
this cluster is typically viewed as being consumed
in geographically local banking markets; and 3)
market structure is a key determinant of the degree
of competition (Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken,
1997; and Jackson, 1992).
1United States vs. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656
(1974); United States vs. Phillipsburg National Bank and
Trust Company, 399 U.S. 350 (1970), and United States vs.
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).8 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 2
1982 Department of Justice horizontal merger guidelines
Post-merger Post-merger change in HHI
market concentration Level of HHI and likelihood of challenge
Highly concentrated Greater than 1,800 Greater than 100—Challenge likely
50 to 100—Depends on other factors
a
Less than 50—Challenge unlikely
Moderately concentrated 1,000 to 1,800 Greater than 100—Challenge likely;
other factors considereda
Less than or equal to 100—Challenge unlikely
Unconcentrated Less than 1,000 Any increase—Challenge unlikely
aLead firm provision—A merger is likely to be challenged if the merger is between the lead firm and a firm
with a market share of 1 percent or more provided that the lead firm has a market share of 35 percent or more
and is approximately twice the size of the second largest firm in the market. These so-called other factors are often
related to ease and profitability of collusion. In banking, they are often referred to as mitigating factors and include
competitive viability of the target, presence of active competition from thrifts and other financial institutions in the
market, competition from out-of-market financial institutions, and market attractiveness.
Note: When released on June 14, 1982, the guidelines in this table applied to all U.S. industries. In 1985, the
U.S. Department of Justice modified the 1,800/50 rule for bank mergers to 1,800/200 to recognize the impact
of competition from limited purpose lenders and other nondepository financial institutions.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, 1982, press release, June 14.
factors, divestiture of some branches and offices may
bring the concentration indicator close to or below
the DOJ guidelines. Consequently, very few bank
mergers are denied due to antitrust concerns. However,
the official statistics do not include applications that
are voluntarily withdrawn when consultation with
regulatory agencies indicates they would be found to
be anticompetitive.
Effects of geographical deregulation on bank
acquisition prices
The literature suggests two competing hypotheses
to explain how geographic deregulation might affect
the prices paid for bank acquisitions (Adkisson and
Fraser, 1990). Under the excess demand theory, prices
of acquisitions should increase as restrictions on expan-
sion are reduced. Prior to RiegleNeal, the number of
potential bidders for a target bank was limited by state
law governing intrastate and interstate acquisitions.
As noted above, during the late 1970 and 1980s,
some states formed regional banking pacts to allow
banks to merge with or acquire targets in pact states
(see details in table 3). Other states allowed nationwide
entry with reciprocal arrangements. As these restric-
tions are removed, the demand for targets should in-
crease as the universe of bidders increases, resulting
in higher acquisition prices. Thus, all else being
equal, higher prices should be observed as states lib-
eralize their interstate banking laws and in the post-
RiegleNeal environment.
Conversely, the barrier to entry theory predicts that
merger prices will be lower when bank acquisition laws
are more liberal. Geographical expansion restrictions
form a barrier to entry that provides the target with a
protected niche and permits it to earn excess profits.
Decreasing the barriers to entry reduces the excess
profits and thereby lowers merger prices. By ensur-
ing that they earn only normal profits, lowering the
barriers to entry may increase substitutability among
target banks, enlarging (from the acquirers perspec-
tive) the effective supply of alternatives. Thus, lower
prices should be observed in regional compact states
and in the post-RiegleNeal environment.
There are at least two approaches to calculating
the price offered by acquirers for targets. One approach
measures the size of the merger premium (or bid pre-
mium). More attractive targets receive higher bid
premiums. The second approach uses stock return
data and is usually called the event study approach.
Under this approach, excess returns (or abnormal
returns) are computed around the merger announce-
ment date (see box 2).
Literature review and our contribution
Previous studies on mergers and acquisitions of
nonfinancial firms have produced mixed results about
the determinants of merger premiums. It is even more
complicated to identify the determinants of these pre-
miums in the banking industry due to the high level of
governmental regulations and monitoring. In addition9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 3
Interstate banking laws prior to RiegleNeal Act
State Area covered and reciprocity
Alabama Reciprocal, 13 states (AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV)
Alaska National, no reciprocity
Arizona National, no reciprocity
Arkansas Reciprocal, 16 states (AL, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MO, MS, NC, NE, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV)
and DC
California National, reciprocal
Colorado National, no reciprocity
Connecticut National, reciprocal
Delaware National, reciprocal
District of Columbia Reciprocal, 11 states (AL, FL, GA, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV)
Florida Reciprocal, 11 states (AL, AR, GA, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV) and DC
Georgia Reciprocal, 11 states (AL, FL, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV) and DC
Idaho National, no reciprocity
Illinois National, reciprocal
Indiana National, reciprocal
Iowa Reciprocal, 6 states (IL, MN, MO, NE, SD, WI)
Kansas Reciprocal, 6 states (AR, CO, IA, MO, NE, OK)
Kentucky National, reciprocal
Louisiana National, reciprocal
Maine National, no reciprocity
Maryland Reciprocal, 14 states (AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, PA, SC, TN, VA, WV) and DC
Massachusetts National, reciprocal
Michigan National, reciprocal
Minnesota Reciprocal, 16 states (CO, IA, ID, IL, IN, KS, MI, MO, MT, ND, NE, OH, SD, WA, WI, WY)
Mississippi Reciprocal, 13 states (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MO, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV)
Missouri Reciprocal, 8 states (AR, IA, IL, KS, KY, NE, OK, TN)
Montana Reciprocal, 7 states (CO, ID, MN, ND, SD, WI, WY)
Nebraska National, reciprocal
Nevada National, no reciprocity
New Hampshire National, no reciprocity
New Jersey National, reciprocal
New Mexico National, no reciprocity
New York National, reciprocal
North Carolina Reciprocal, 13 states (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) and DC
North Dakota National, reciprocal
Ohio National, reciprocal
Oklahoma National, no reciprocity for initial entry; after initial entry, bank holding company must
be from state offering reciprocity or wait 4 years to expand
Oregon National, no reciprocity
Pennsylvania National, reciprocal
South Carolina Reciprocal, 12 states (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, TN, VA, WV) and DC
Rhode Island National, reciprocal
South Dakota National, reciprocal
Tennessee National, reciprocal
Texas National, no reciprocity
Utah National, no reciprocity
Vermont National, reciprocal
Virginia Reciprocal, 12 states (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC, TN, WV) and DC
Washington National, reciprocal
West Virginia National, reciprocal
Wisconsin Reciprocal, 8 states (IA, IL, IN, KY, MI, MN, MO, OH)
Wyoming National, no reciprocity
Note: Hawaii did not enact interstate bank holding company legislation.
Source: Savage (1993).10 Economic Perspectives
BOX 2
Estimating the stock price impact of mergers
We estimate the stock price impact of each of
these merger announcements by employing a multi-
variate regression model (MVRM), similar to those
used in Schipper and Thompson (1983), Binder
(1988), and Cornett and Tehranian (1989). In the
MVRM, abnormal returns are obtained by adding
a (0,1) binary variable to the right-hand side of the
traditional market model to capture the impact of
the announcement or event date. The model takes
the following form:
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where Rj,t is the return on firm j on day t; RM,t is the
return on the market portfolio; aj is an intercept
coefficient for bank j; bj,1...j,5 are risk coefficients for
the jth bank; gj is the effect of the merger announce-
ment event on the jth firm; D
s is an event binary
variable which equals 1 on day s (s = 0 to +1) in the
event window, and 0 otherwise; and ej,t is a random
error term which is assumed to be identically distrib-
uted normally, independent of the return on the
market and the binary variables. We specify the
market return at several leads and lags as an explan-
atory variable to correct for the possibility of non-
synchronous trading, especially of some of the
smaller banks (Scholes and Williams, 1977).
With this specification, the estimated parameters
gj measure the daily abnormal returns associated with
a merger announcement. We are testing for daily
intercept shifts in the interval day 0 to day +1.
Since this interval is dummied out, the observa-
tions in the day 0 to day +1 interval do not influ-
ence the estimate of the intercept. Only those
observations without dummies determine the value
of the intercept.
We estimate the target banks cumulative ab-
normal stock market returns over the two trading
day period that includes the announcement date
and the day after. The two-day cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) around the merger announcement
date (t = 0 and +1) are then calculated by adding
g
j,0 and g
j,1. The standardized cumulative abnormal
returns are computed using a procedure reported in
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), and Stultz, Walk-
ing, and Song (1990). First, the standardized ab-
normal return to the jth security on day t (SARj,t)
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where AR
j,t is the abnormal return to the jth security
on day t, Sj is the standard deviation of the residu-
als in the market model estimation period, Tj is the
number of days in the estimation period, Rm,t is the
return on the market portfolio on day t, and R 
m is
the mean return on the market portfolio over the
estimation period.
The SARj,t is then used to obtain the standard-












to characteristics of the deal, the target, and the
acquiring banks, regulatory environments in both
acquiring and target bank states tend to affect the bid
premiums (see Palia, 1993). The analysis of bank
merger premiums is further complicated by regulatory
uncertainty (see Desai and Stover, 1985). All bank
mergers require time-consuming regulatory approval,
making hostile takeovers extremely difficult to execute.
Previous bank studies (Beatty, Santomero, and
Smirlock, 1987; Cheng, Gup, and Wall, 1989; Fraser
and Kolari, 1988; Rogowski and Simonson, 1989;
and Rose, 1991), find that asset size, profitability,
management, leverage, means of payment, and
whether the mergers are interstate or intrastate are
significant in determining the bid premiums or
explaining the stock markets reaction to bank merger
announcements.
The literature suggests that size is important in
determining the bid premiums offered to the target,
but less important in determining the abnormal returns.
For example, Desai and Stover (1985) find that the
relative size of target and acquiring banks has no sig-
nificant impact on the abnormal returns around the
announcement date. However, Shawky, Kilb, and
Staas (1996) find that smaller targets tend to be offered
a larger bid premium, and Palia (1993) finds that the11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
relative size of targets and acquiring banks is impor-
tant in explaining the variation in the bid premiums.
With regard to profitability and capital, Shawky,
Kilb, and Staas (1996) find that higher bid premiums
tend to be offered to target banks with larger returns
on equity and those with higher leverage. The latter
result suggests that higher leverage may be associated
with more efficient use of capital.
Whether the merger deals are stock exchange
offers or cash offers may also affect the abnormal
returns and the bid premiumsbecause of the differ-
ential tax implications associated with these offers.
The market may view a cash offer positively for the
acquirer, because it allows the acquiring bank to in-
crease the depreciation tax shield as the depreciation
basis of the acquired assets rises to the market value.
However, the market may view it negatively for the
target, because it imposes a greater immediate tax
burden on target shareholders. However, the market
may view a cash offer negatively for the acquirer and
positively for the target if the acquirers share price is
relatively overvalued. Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996)
find that the bid premiums offered to target banks are
larger for stock deals (rather than cash payment),
supporting the acquirers overvalued stock hypothesis.
However, Cornett and De (1991b) find that mergers
financed with only stock or only cash produce higher
abnormal returns to target shareholders than those
financed with combinations of stock and cash. Inter-
estingly, previous studies on nonbank mergers find
medium of payment to be unimportant (Eckbo and
Langohr, 1989; and Travlos, 1987).
Rhoades (1987) suggests that geographical expan-
sion may be a primary motivation for bank mergers.
Palia (1993) and Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996) find
that the bid premiums offered to target banks are
larger for out-of-state mergers than intrastate merg-
ers. Using interstate bank mergers, Cornett and De
(1991a) find significant positive announcement peri-
od abnormal returns for both target and acquiring
banks. Again, this contrasts with findings for nonbank
mergers, suggesting that bank mergers are different
and, thus, the results for nonbank mergers cannot be
generalized to the banking sector.
Examining the postmerger performance of large
bank mergers between 1982 and 1987, Cornett and
Tehranian (1992) find that merged banks tend to per-
form better than the banking industry overall. This
superior performance resulted from improvements in
the merged banks ability to attract loans and deposits,
employee productivity, and asset growth. (For a recent
literature review on bank merger performance, see
Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell, 2000.)
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) examine operating
cash flows as well as several accounting variables of
the merged banks for one to three years after the
mergers. Recognizing that accounting data are not
perfect measures of economic performance, they uti-
lize both accounting and market data to determine
whether stock price gains associated with mergers
announcement (short run) are the result of real eco-
nomic gains (long run). Interestingly, they find a sig-
nificant correlation between announcement-period
abnormal stock returns and the various long-term per-
formance measures, and conclude that market partici-
pants are able to identify in advance the improved
performance associated with bank acquisitions.6 We
focus on short-term performance, using market data,
rather than testing whether mergers will result in effi-
ciency gains or improved long-run performance.
Overall, the empirical results presented in the
previous studies have been mixed and largely depend
on the sample period, sample observations, and meth-
odology. We reexamine this issue using more recent
and more complete data on bank mergers. Our results
are more applicable to current policy issues than
previous studies, given the rapidly evolving environ-
ment the banking industry faces.
The data
We obtained details of all bank mergers and acqui-
sitions from 1990 to mid-1998 from the Security Data
Corporation (SDC). To be included in our sample,
both the target and bidding banks must be publicly
traded.7 We obtained financial data from the quarterly
call reports and bank holding company Y9 reports, as
of yearend prior to the merger announcement date.
Stock market returns for target banks and the stock
market index are from the Center for Research in
Security Prices data tape. The merger announcement
date, target name, acquirer name, value of the deal,
bid premium, and other characteristics of the merger
announcement are from the SDC database. We ob-
tained the HHIs for various banking markets from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Banking agencies consider a local, economically
integrated area to be a banking market. In practice,
this usually means a city, a metropolitan statistical area
(MSA), or a rural county. We matched the target banks
headquarters with an MSA or county. This does not
allow us to consider a target bank present in several
different market areas and points to the difficulty of
using local market concentration measures for banking
organizations that have broad geographical scope and
product mix. The price that a bank offers (or accepts)
reflects the activities of the entire organization.12 Economic Perspectives
BOX 3
The model
The following basic specification is used to ex-
amine the factors that are correlated with the
bid premium offered for the target (BVPREM):






















where PROFIT is a measure of profitability of
the target one-year before the merger an-
nouncement date; LEV is the capital-to-deposit
ratio one year before the merger announcement
date; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total as-
sets of the target banking organization; LOAN
is ratio of total loans to total assets; CHARGE
is the ratio of net chargeoffs- to-loans;
MEQUAL is an indicator variable that is equal
to one if the target and the acquirer are of
equal asset size and zero otherwise; THRIFT is
an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
target is a savings and loan association and
zero otherwise; SEAST is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if the target and acquirer
are located in the Southeast regional compact
(AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, SC,
TN, VA, and DC) and zero otherwise; RNEAL is
an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
merger announcement date is after 1994 and zero
otherwise; and e
j,t is a random error term. The
MEQUAL variable is included in the equation to
determine whether banks involved in mergers of
equals are offered a different price than other
banks. The THRIFT variable is included in the
equation to control for the different charter be-
tween banking organizations and thrift institutions.
The SEAST variable is included to capture whether
the southeast regional compact led to differences
in bid premium. This indicator variable absorbs
the effects of all factors that are common to bank-
ing organizations in the Southeast. The RNEAL
variable is included to capture the impact of the
RiegleNeal Act on bid premiums.
In some specifications, we include indicator
variables for the year of the announcement date of
the acquisitions that range between 1990 and mid-
1998. These variables are introduced to account
for the effect of omitted macroeconomic and other
variables that may influence the overall level of
acquisition activity over time and, thus, the merger
premium paid for a given transaction.
The methodology
We use a regression model that relates a target
bank bid premium to profitability, asset size, financial
leverage, loan quality, Southeast indicator variable,
RiegleNeal indicator variable, and a concentration
measure. A formal discussion of the model is pre-
sented in box 3.
To capture the profitability of a target banking
organization, we include the return on equity and the
return on assets in the year before the merger announce-
ment date. We expect the sign on profitability to be
positive, as higher profits are more attractive.
We include a variable that measures the size of
each target. Bank size, as measured by the natural
logarithm of total assets, may be either positively or
negatively associated with the attractiveness of a given
target. A positive coefficient for this variable would
be consistent with the hypothesis that potential bidders
look for significant targets that participate in significant
markets. A negative coefficient, if found, may reflect
the cost of melding the culture of a large target bank
with that of the acquirer.
Banking organizations are required by regulation
to meet minimum capital requirements. This regulation
is aimed at reducing the risk-taking propensities of
bank shareholders. That is, capital acts as a form of
co-insurance with federal deposit insurance. We include
the leverage ratio, defined as the capital-to-deposit
ratio, in the year before the merger announcement
date. We expect the sign on the leverage ratio to be
negative. A high capital-to-deposit ratio may be an
indication that the target banking organization is us-
ing capital inefficiently. This argument is consistent
with Beatty, Santomero, and Smirlock (1987), Fraser
and Kolari (1988), and Rogowski and Simonson
(1989). A well-capitalized acquirer seeks target banks
that offer an ample inexpensive source of funds.
Because loans are usually the most illiquid and
subject to the greatest default risk of all bank assets,
a banks risk is greatly influenced by the quality of
its loan portfolio. The ratio of loans to total assets
measures the potential effects of loan losses on assets
and equity and the illiquidity of assets. According to
our hypothesis, the greater the proportion of loans to13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 4
Selected financial characteristics of target and price information
Quartile Range %
Financial characteristics (1 = lowest) (of explanatory variable) CAR (%) SCAR (%) BVPREM
Book value of capital/total assets 1 2.2–6.8 14.0 5.1 2.1
2 6.8–8.1 11.0 4.2 2.4
3 8.1–9.4 12.5 4.8 2.1
4 9.4–25.4 8.3 3.4 2.2
Total loans/total assets 1 22.3–55.5 12.1 4.8 1.9
2 55.5–63.5 13.3 5.3 2.3
3 63.5–68.9 9.2 3.9 2.3
4 68.9–89.2 11.1 3.5 2.2
Total assets (in millions) 1 35.7–272.0 11.4 3.6 2.1
2 272.0–902.3 13.2 4.4 2.0
3 902.3–3,276.1 10.2 4.1 2.3
4 3,276.1–260,159 11.0 5.5 2.2
Return on assets 1 –1.3–0.4 10.8 3.6 1.6
2 0.4–0.9 12.9 4.8 2.1
3 0.9–1.2 10.5 3.9 2.2
4 1.2–2.2 11.5 5.2 2.8
Riegle–Neal (0 before act, 1 after) 0 96 (122) 13.0 4.1 1.7
1 146 (205) 10.4 4.6 2.4
Notes: CAR is cumulative abnormal returns; SCAR is standardized cumulative abnormal returns;
BVPREM is the bid premium offered for the target. CAR and SCAR means are computed using data
for a subsample of 242 acquirer institutions. Number of observations in parentheses is out of the
327 observations constituting the entire sample.
Mean values
total assets, the greater the potential for loan losses
and the lower the liquidity of assets, ceteris paribus.
Everything else held constant, this should lead to a
lower bid premium. However, because loans offer
the potential for geographical diversification, the
loan portfolio could have a positive impact on the bid
premium. Thus, we include the ratio of net chargeoffs
to loans to capture asset quality more directly.
Another hypothesis we examine is whether state
and federal laws on interstate and intrastate branch-
ing and banking influence the price offered for target
banks. To capture whether the Southeast regional
compact led to differences in bid premiums, we in-
clude a Southeast indicator variable, which absorbs
the effects of all factors that are common to banks in
the Southeast.
Our regression equation also includes an indica-
tor variable that captures the impact of the RiegleNeal
Act on the bid premium. A positive coefficient on
this variable is consistent with the notion that the
universe of actual or potential bidder has increased,
resulting in higher acquisition prices. A negative coef-
ficient is consistent with the notion that liberalization
of interstate banking laws reduces excess profits,
leading to lower merger prices.
Finally, we include indicator variables for the
year of the merger announcement date from 1990 to
mid-1998 to account for the effects of omitted mac-
roeconomic and other variables that may influence
the level of acquisition activity over time and, thus,
the merger premium paid for a given transaction.
The results
Table 4 provides a summary of selected financial
characteristics of the target, bid premiums, and cumu-
lative abnormal returns (CAR). The standardized cu-
mulative abnormal returns (SCAR) are the cumulative
abnormal returns adjusted for the error in forecasting
the returns (see box 2). The results show that targets
with lower capital-to-asset ratios and higher profit-
ability (larger return on assets) tend to obtain larger
stock price gains, as measured by CAR and SCAR,
around the merger announcement date than those
with high capital-to-asset ratios or lower profitability.
In addition, the stock market abnormal returns around
the announcement of the merger seem to be larger at14 Economic Perspectives
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Assets ³$10 billiona 2.3612 8.1679








aExcluding banking organizations classified as mergers of equals.
***Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Note: The t-statistics are in parentheses.
returns) varies depending on the size of the
target banks. Overall, the larger the target
bank, the larger the standardized cumula-
tive abnormal returns around the merger
date (see table 4).8 Finally, table 5 shows
that the standardized cumulative abnor-
mal returns are not statistically different
whether the target is a bank or thrift.
However, the bid premiums offered for
target banks are, on average, significantly
larger then those offered for thrifts.
Table 6 separates the megamerger
deals from the rest of the sample. The
pattern of variation of the bid premiums
according to target size is now more evi-
dent. Within the large target bank group,
there appears to be a U-shaped relation-
ship between total assets and bid premi-
ums: relatively high for the lowest quartile
of banking organizations, decreasing to
the next quartile, and rising thereafter.
There appears to be little if any noticeable
pattern in bid premiums for targets with
total assets less than $10 billion. While
returns are smaller for megamergers of
target banks larger than $10 billion than
for other mergers, there is no clear pattern
of variation in standardized cumulative
abnormal returns within each group.
Table 7 provides information on
market concentration and merger prices.
These numbers suggest that bid premi-
ums increase with concentration, espe-
cially for banks with total assets greater than or
equal to $10 billion. Thus, it appears that large
TABLE 6
Size and pricing of bank mergers
Book
Quartile value
(1 = lowest) premium SCARb








aExcluding banking organizations classified as mergers
of equals.
bStandardized cumulative abnormal returns.
larger target banks. The abnormal returns tend to
decline as the targets proportion of loans to assets
increases. Similarly, the bid premiums tend to increase
with the targets return on assets, and have become
larger in the post-RiegleNeal period. Unlike the
abnormal returns, the bid premiums offered for tar-
gets seem to be positively correlated with the loan
to assets ratio.
Table 5 presents the bid premiums and the stan-
dardized cumulative abnormal returns for different
target characteristics. The targets abnormal returns
around the merger announcement date are significantly
larger for targets in the Southeast regional compact.
Interestingly, while both the bid premiums and the
abnormal returns are generally larger in the post-
RiegleNeal periods (as presented in table 4), they are
significantly smaller for target banks in the Southeast.
The results from both tables 4 and 5 suggest that
the bid premiums are not statistically different among
targets with different asset sizes. However, the stock
market reaction (the standardized cumulative abnormal15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 7
Market concentration and the pricing
of  bank mergers
Concentration Book
quartile value
(1 = lowest) premium SCARb








aExcluding banking organizations classified as mergers
of equals.
bStandardized cumulative abnormal returns.
banks pay more for target banks located in less
competitive markets.
Table 8 provides detail on megamergers of tar-
gets larger than $10 billion, as well as megamergers
of equalsthe bid premium and the standardized
cumulative abnormal return around the merger an-
nouncement date are presented for each merger deal.
The standardized cumulative abnormal returns, on
average, are much larger for megamergers overall than
for megamergers of equals. The problem of melding
the culture of a large target bank with that of the ac-
quirer is anticipated by the market to be more serious
in megamergers of equals deals. Unlike the standard-
ized cumulative abnormal returns, the bid premiums
are approximately the same, on average, for both mega-
mergers of equals and other megamergers.
The statistics presented in tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8
are averages, and do not control for the other character-
istics of the target, the acquiring bank, the deal, and the
year of the merger. We control for these characteristics
in the regression analysis presented in  tables 911.
Table 9 presents the regression analysis explaining
the bid premiums offered for targets using the finan-
cial characteristics of the target and selected factors
associated with the transaction, based on equation 1
in box 3. The first three columns present the results
using return on book equity as a measure of profit-
ability. The last three columns present the results
 using return on assets as a measure of profitability.
Columns 1 and 4 of table 9 represent the basic model
for each measure of profitability, excluding the time
indicator variables and the composite of the South-
east region compact indicator and the RiegleNeal
indicator. Columns 2 and 5 expand the basic equa-
tion to include the composite term. Finally, columns
3 and 6 add the time indicator variables that control
for the year of each merger announcement.
The results in column 1 of table 9 show that
more profitable target banks, as measured by higher
return on equity, are offered larger bid premiums
than less profitable targets. The bid premium increases
with the asset size of the target and decreases with
the ratio of equity to deposits, although the effects
are not statistically significant. Similarly, the loan-to-
assets and net-chargeoffs-to-loans ratios are both
insignificant in explaining variation in the bid pre-
mium across deals. The results also indicate that bid
premiums are larger for target banks than thrifts,
larger for targets located in the Southeast regional
compact, and larger in the post-RiegleNeal period.
The results in table 9 also suggest that the bid pre-
miums tend to be lower for megamergers of equals
than for other mergers. However, this effect is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
Table 9, column 2 includes the composite term
that interacts the RiegleNeal indicator variable with
the Southeast regional compact indicator variable.
The total impact on the bid premium for target banks
located in the Southeast regional compact after
RiegleNeal is the sum of the coefficients on the
Southeast regional compact indicator variable, 0.4459,
and the RiegleNeal and Southeast regional compact
composite indicator variable, 0.2681. Thus, holding
everything else constant, in the post-RiegleNeal pe-
riod, bid premiums are lower in the Southeast region-
al compact states than in the pre-RiegleNeal period.
Column 3 of table 9 reports the results of in-
cluding time indicator variables (and excluding the
RiegleNeal indicator variable) and the composite
term in the basic regression equation. When we add
the time indicator variables, the coefficient estimates
on return on equity, thrift indicator, and Southeast
regional compact indicator are qualitatively similar
to those reported in column 1 of table 9. For example,
the coefficient on the Southeast regional compact
indicator continues to suggest that mergers between
banking organizations located in the Southeast states
during the post-RiegleNeal period result in higher
bid premiums than those in other states. The effect
of 0.4333 in this specification is even greater than
the effect of 0.3439 in the basic model in column 1.
In the specification in column 3, both the asset size
of the target banks and the ratio of equity to deposits
are now significantly correlated with bid premiums.
The results suggest that larger target banks receive
larger bid premiums. This result is consistent with
the notion that banks are using their increased freedom
to merge in a way intended to increase the value
of their deposit insurance, generating higher bid16 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 8
Characteristics of large bank mergers during the 1990s
Book Standardized
Total assets value excess
Acquiring bank of target premium return Year
 ($ bil.)
Targets with assets >$10 billion
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation Chemical Banking Corporation 61.5 0.70 7.57 1991
C&S/Sovran Corporation NCNB Corporation 51.4 1.49 4.62 1991
Security Pacific Corporation BankAmerica Corporation 88.0 1.17 11.50 1991
Ameritrust Corporation Society Corporation 11.0 1.99 0.65 1991
Manufacturers National Corporation Comerica Inc. 12.1 1.34 6.46 1991
MNC Financial Inc. NationsBank Corporation 17.5 1.33 –1.55 1992
Continental Bank Corporation BankAmerica Corporation 22.5 1.35 10.20 1994
Michigan National Corporation National Australia Bank Ltd. 10.2 1.69 10.03 1995
Shawmut National Corporation Fleet Financial Group Inc. 31.3 1.79 9.18 1995
First Fidelity Bancorporation First Union Corporation 36.2 1.92 13.82 1995
Midlantic Corporation PNC Bank Corporation 13.3 2.12 6.54 1995
Integra Financial Corporation National City 13.7 1.97 4.87 1995
Meridian Bancorp Inc. Corestates Financial Corporation 15.0 2.17 5.71 1995
First Interstate Bancorp Wells Fargo & Company 55.8 3.35 18.16 1995
BayBanks Bank of Boston Corporation 10.8 2.22 5.40 1995
Boatmen’s Bancshares NationsBank Corporation 33.7 2.71 14.35 1996
Standard Fed Bancorp ABN-AMRO Holding NV 13.3 2.05 –2.76 1996
US Bancorp First Bank System 31.9 3.38 9.76 1997
Central Fidelity Banks Inc. Wachovia Corporation 10.6 2.81 8.32 1997
Signet Banking Corporation First Union Corporation 11.7 3.46 18.64 1997
Barnett Banks NationsBank Corporation 41.4 4.05 10.28 1997
Corestates Financial Corporation First Union Corporation 45.6 5.39 3.51 1997
First of American Bank National City 22.1 3.84 12.58 1997
Average 28.7 2.36 8.17
Mergers of equals
KeyCorp, Albany, NY Society Corporation 25.5 1.82 — 1993
BB&T Financial Corporation Southern National 9.2 2.32 2.29 1994
First Chicago Corporation NBD Bancorp 65.9 1.30 1.87 1995
Chase Manhattan Corporation Chemical Banking Corporation 114.0 1.38 3.76 1995
First Chicago NBD Corporation Banc One Corporation 114.1 3.68 0.52 1998
BankAmerica Corporation NationsBank Corporation 260.0 3.06 1.52 1998
Wells Fargo & Company Norwest Corporation 97.5 2.70 –2.13 1998
Average 98.0 2.32 1.30
premiums with higher asset size. The ratio of equity
to deposits (leverage ratio) is significantly negative,
indicating that higher leverage targets are offered
larger bid premiums than other leveraged institutions.
These less-capitalized target banks are viewed by the
acquirers as being more efficient in their use of expen-
sive capital funding; thus, the acquirers are willing to
pay a larger bid premium. Finally, the time indicators
suggest that bid premiums have been increasing over
time. For example, merger bid premiums in 1997
were, on average, 0.6692 percentage points below
those in 1998, while in 1996 they were 1.2543 per-
centage points below the 1998 level.
Columns 4 to 6 of table 9 report the results of
using return on assets rather than return on equity as
a measure of profitability. As in columns 1 to 3, bid
premiums increase with profitability as measured by
return on assets. Moreover, the asset size of the target
banks and the ratio of equity to deposits are statisti-
cally significantly related to bid premiums in almost
every empirical specification. The coefficients on the
thrift and Southeast regional compact indicators are
roughly the same as those reported in columns 13
of table 9. The model specification fits well, explain-
ing almost 25 percent of the variation in the bid pre-
miums offered for targets across all merger deals.
Table 10 uses the targets standardized excess
returns as the dependent variable in the regression
equation rather than the bid premium. As shown in17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 9
Relationship between bid premium and target financial characteristics
Profitability as return on equity Profitability as return on total assets
Southeast Southeast
compact compact
Basic interacted with Time binary Basic interacted with Basic
Variables controls Riegle–Neal variables controls Riegle–Neal variables
Return on equity 3.3169 3.2695 3.0487 — — —
(2.82)*** (2.86)*** (2.82)***
Return on assets — — — 39.8565 40.4137 31.8314
(2.69)*** (2.73)*** (2.18)**
Natural logarithm 0.0636 0.0630 0.0758 0.0681 0.0676 0.0812
  of total assets (1.54) (1.52) (1.89)* (1.65)* (1.63)* (2.02)**
Book value of equity –2.9059 –2.8209 –3.8521 –4.1854 –4.1216 –4.9113
  to total deposits (–1.51) (–1.46) (–2.11)** (–2.14)** (–2.10)** (–2.64)***
Loans to total assets 0.7767 0.7357 0.6238 0.7742 0.7341 0.5952
(1.31) (1.24) (1.12) (1.31) (1.24) (1.06)
Net chargeoffs to loans –12.9726 –12.6326 –10.4068 –14.7443 –14.4692 –14.2260
(–1.18) (–1.15) (–1.00) (–1.37) (–1.34) (–1.38)
Thrift indicator –0.5178 –0.5191 –0.4248 –0.4846 –0.4859 –0.4412
(–2.21)** (–2.22)** (–1.92)* (–2.01)** (–2.01)** (–1.92)*
Megamergers of equals –0.1573 –0.1281 –0.4647 –0.0554 –0.0254 –0.3568
  indicator (–0.32) (–0.26) (–0.99) (–0.11) (–0.05) (–0.76)
Southeast regional 0.3439 0.4459 0.4333 0.3287 0.4274 0.4197
  compact indicator (2.39)** (2.44)** (2.51)** (2.27)** (2.34)** (2.42)**
Riegle–Neal 0.3577 0.2855 — 0.3621 0.2923 —
(2.52)** (1.75)* (2.54)** (1.79)*
(Southeast regional — –0.2681 –0.2753 — –0.2598 –0.2554
  compact) x (Riegle–Neal (–0.91) (–0.99) (–0.88) (–0.92)
  indicator)
1990 — — –2.1043 — — –2.0594
(–4.88)*** (–4.74)***
1991 — — –1.5333 — — –1.5081
(–4.92)*** (–4.76)***
1992 — — –1.5709 — — –1.5937
(–4.85)*** (–4.89)***
1993 — — –0.9094 — — –0.9140
(–3.23)*** (–3.23)***
1994 — — –1.0488 — — –1.0410
(–3.75)*** (–3.70)***
1995 — — –1.3827 — — –1.3468
(–5.55)*** (–5.37)**
1996 — — –1.2543 — — –1.2362
(–4.96)*** (–4.85)***
1997 — — –0.6692 — — –0.6642
(–2.71)*** (–2.59)**
Number of observations 327 327 327 327 327 327
Adjusted R2 0.1337 0.1358 0.2432 0.1319 0.1313 0.2355
F-statistic 6.592 6.693 7.1641 6.503 5.926 6.908
***Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.18 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 10
Standardized excess returns of target and target financial characteristics
Profitability as return on equity Profitability as return on assets
Southeast Southeast
compact compact
Basic interacted with Time Basic interacted with Time
Variables controls Riegle–Neal indicator controls Riegle–Neal indicator
Return on equity 0.1101 0.1249 0.1189 — — —
(1.55) (1.78)* (1.66)*
Return on assets — — — 0.7750 0.9671 1.0524
(0.82) (1.03) (1.10)
Natural logarithm 0.0074 0.0076 0.0073 0.0077 0.0079 0.0076
 of total assets (2.88)*** (3.00) *** (2.77)*** (3.03)*** (3.16)*** (2.87) ***
Book value of equity –0.1361 –0.1267 –0.1127 –0.1598 –0.1561 –0.1427
 to total deposits (–1.07) (–1.01) (–0.89) (–1.23) (–1.22) (–1.01)
(–2.52)** (–2.58)** (–2.24)** (–2.57)** (–2.62)*** (–2.25)**
Net chargeoffs to loans 0.1095 0.0187 0.0113 0.4139 0.2940 0.2370
(–0.16) (–0.03) (–0.02) (–0.51) (–0.44)  (–0.35)
Thrift indicator 0.0158 0.0172 0.0141 0.0124 0.0140 0.0120
(1.10) (1.22) (0.97) (0.83) (0.95) (0.79)
Megamergers of equals
 indicator –0.0592 0.0518 –0.0445 0.0561 –0.0484 –0.0412
(2.05)** (1.82)* (–1.51) (1.94)* (1.69)* (–1.40)
Southeast regional 0.0224 0.0421 0.0420 0.0226 0.0418 0.0416
 compact indicator (2.47)**  (3.77)***  (3.65) ***  (2.45)**  (3.72)*** (3.60)***
Riegle–Neal indicator 0.0068 –0.0061 — 0.0074 –0.0052 —
(0.77) (–0.63) (0.84) (–0.54)
(Southeast regional — –0.0548 –0.0543 — –0.0538 –0.0536
 compact) × (Riegle-Neal (–2.95) *** (–2.89)*** (–2.89)*** (–2.84) ***
 indicator)
1990 — — 0.0504 — — 0.0519
(1.98)** (2.03)**
1991 — — 0.0306 — — 0.0308
(1.55) (1.54)*
1992 — — 0.0267 — — 0.0253
 (1.21) (1.14)
1993 — — 0.0217 — — 0.0206
(1.14)  (1.08)
1994 — — 0.0258 — — 0.0264
(1.38) (1.40)
1995 — — 0.0335 — — 0.0349
(1.92)* (2.00)**
1996 — — 0.0302 — — 0.0303
(1.75)* (1.75)*
1997 — — 0.0136 — — 0.0141
(0.80) (0.83)
Number of observations 242 242 242 242 242 242
Adjusted R2 0.0694 0.0994 0.0994 0.0625 0.0912 0.0933
F-statistics 2.996 3.659 2.565 2.784 3.4519 2.458
***Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
table 10, the standardized excess returns tend to be
greater for more profitable banks. However, the effect
is only marginally significant. On the other hand,
there is a greater stock market reaction
for larger target banks, possibly reflecting
the fact that bid premiums tend to increase
with target bank asset size. The coeffi-
cient on the megamergers of equals indica-
tor variable is negative and, in four out of
six cases, statistically significant at con-
ventional levels, indicating that the stock
market reacts relatively negatively to an-
nouncements of such mergers. For exam-
ple, the coefficient estimate in column 1
of table 10 suggests that standardized ex-
cess returns for these megamergers of
equals announcements were 5.92 percent-
age points less than for other merger an-
nouncements. This negative response may
be due to the higher cost of melding the
culture of two large banking organiza-
tions. The Southeast regional compact in-
dicator variable has a positive coefficient
in all six specifications in table 10, show-
ing that the targets standardized excess
returns around the merger announcement
date are significantly larger for targets in
the Southeast regional compact states.
The composite term that interacts the
RiegleNeal and the Southeast regional
compact indicators is negative and statis-
tically significant. Thus, relative to the
pre-RiegleNeal period, the stock market
reaction is less in the post-RiegleNeal
period to announcements of mergers of
banks located in the Southeast regional
compact states. This result is consistent
with the notion that bank merger prices
will be lower when bank acquisition laws
are more liberal.
The targets standardized excess re-
turns around the merger announcement
date are significantly lower for targets
with higher loan-to-asset ratios. The
results indicate that the book value of
equity to total deposits and net-charge-
offs-to-loans ratios are insignificant in
explaining variation in standardized ex-
cess returns across deals. As in table 5,
the results in table 10 show that standard-
ized excess returns are not statistically
different for banks and thrifts.
Table 11 presents the regression anal-
ysis explaining merger prices using market concentra-
tion, in addition to the financial characteristics of the
target and control factors used in tables 9 and 10.
TABLE 11
Bid premiums and financial characteristics with market
concentration measure
Profitability as Profitability as
Variables return on equity return on total assets
Return on equity 3.0500 —
(2.81)***
Return on assets — 30.9000
(2.18)**
Natural logarithm 0.0760 0.0815
of total assets (1.88)* (2.02)**
Book value of equity –3.8590 –4.9265
to total deposits (–2.11)** (–2.64)**
Loans to total assets 0.6239 0.5944
(1.12) (1.06)
Net chargeoffs to loans –10.4294 –14.2521
(–1.00) (–1.38)
Market concentration –0.0364 –0.0625
(–0.06) (–0.11)
Thrift indicator –0.4243 –0.4401
(–1.91)* (–1.91)*
Southeast regional 0.4323 0.4179
compact indicator (2.49)** (2.39)**
(Southeast regional compact) –0.2727 –0.2509

















Number of observations 327 327
Adjusted R2 0.2408 0.2331
F-statistic 6.744 6.504
***Indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
**Indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*Indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.20 Economic Perspectives
NOTES
The main results remain pretty much unchanged
from table 9. For example, the coefficient on the
Southeast regional compact indicator continues to be
positive, suggesting that mergers between banking
organizations in the Southeast during the post-Riegle
Neal period result in higher bid premiums (and stan-
dardized excess returns, which are not shown here but
are available from the authors) than those in other
states. The results in table 11 indicate that market con-
centration is not significant in explaining either the
variation in the bid premiums that the acquiring banks
are willing to pay or the standardized excess returns
as a result of the merger announcement, when con-
trolling for characteristics of the targets and the
transactions.
Conclusion
The wave of bank consolidation in the 1990s has
dramatically changed the structure of the U.S. banking
industry. The number of banks has significantly
declined, with much fewer smaller banks and more
large superregional and money center banks. The
market shares of large banks have also become much
larger as a result of megamergers and mergers of
equals. The rapid pace of bank mergers and acquisi-
tions is likely to continue into the future. Moreover,
the pace of bank acquisitions of security firms and
insurance companies is also likely to rise in the future
as a result of the recent enactment of the Gramm
LeachBliley Act of 1999.
This article presents evidence on the different
motivations affecting merger bid premiums that the
acquiring banks are willing to offer for the targets
as well as the announcement-period abnormal stock
returns. We find that the following target banks are
likely to be offered a larger bid premiummore
profitable targets with higher returns on assets and/or
returns on equity, and less-capitalized target banks
with high leverage ratios.
The positive correlation between target size and
the standardized abnormal (excess) returns around
the merger announcement date implies that the mar-
ket views the mergers positively when the potential
bidders look for large targets that participate in signifi-
cant markets. However, the abnormal returns are sig-
nificantly lower for megamergers of equals than for
other mergers, probably because the market antici-
pates problems in melding the cultures of two large
banks. Regarding the capital ratio, unlike bank regu-
lators, which favor better-capitalized banks, acquir-
ing banks tend to prefer targets that offer an ample,
inexpensive source of funds. In addition, target banks
tend to receive larger bid offers than thrifts.
Our results show that banks located in the
Southeast regional compact statesthe only group
that operated as a cohesive unit in our sample period,
restricting entry by banks from states outside of the
regionreceive larger bid premiums than targets in
other parts of the country. Overall, the bid premiums are
larger in the post-RiegleNeal period, consistent with
the notion that as the universe of actual or potential bid-
ders has expanded, acquisition prices have risen.
If market participants are able to identify in
advance the improved performance associated with
bank acquisitions, as documented in Cornett and
Tehranian (1992), the bid premiums and the announce-
ment-period abnormal stock returns examined here
should be positively correlated with the long-term
performance of the merged banks. Smaller bid premi-
ums and abnormal returns at targets larger than $10
billion in megamergers of equals suggest that future
megamerger applications between banks and other
bank or nonbank financial institutions should be moni-
tored more closely. Our results also imply that these
megamergers of equals are not perceived by the mar-
ket to have the benefit of creating a bank that is too
big to fail.
1Prior to the RiegleNeal Act, banking organizations could con-
duct interstate banking operations through nonbank banks
those that do not meet the definition of bank. Banks are commonly
defined as institutions that both accept demand deposits and make
commercial loans.
2States could individually opt out of this branching authority or
choose to adopt an earlier starting date.
3Siems (1996) examines bank megamerger deals in 199095, and
concludes that market powers are not the primary motivation for
the mergers.
4See Cetorelli (1999) for a discussion of the HHI.
5When first introduced the 1982, the DOJ horizontal merger
guidelines listed in table 2 applied to all U.S. industries. In 1985,
the DOJ modified the 1,800/50 rule for bank mergers to 1,800/
200 to recognize the impact of competition from thrifts and non-
depository institutions.
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court, in the Connecticut
National Bank case (1974), concluded that thrifts should not be
included in the calculation of concentration measures because
they were not offering the cluster of banking services. However,
the court did recognize that thrifts could be included if they
became significant competitors for a broad range of consumer
services. With the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act (1980) and the GarnSt. Germain21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Act (1982), which effectively deregulated the thrift industry,
thrifts were authorized to compete with banks in providing the
cluster of products previously unique to commercial banking or-
ganizations. By the mid-1980s competition from thrifts had
grown to such a point that the Federal Reserve Board changed its
rules regarding delegation of authority of the Federal Reserve
Banks to give thrifts a weight of 50 percent when calculating
concentration numbers, to reflect both actual and potential com-
petition from thrifts. In some cases, it may give 100 percent
weight to thrifts when they are significant competitors.
6Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1991) perform a similar study on
nonregulated firms.
7Due to the sample bias problem stemming from this criterion, the
result may not be applicable to small banks.
8An exception is evident, however, for megamergers of equals
(shown in table 8). That is, the abnormal returns are significantly
smaller for money center banks with total assets more than $10
billion compared with the rest of the population. The smaller
stock price gain around the merger date for megamergers of
equals of targets larger than $10 billion may represent a higher
cost of melding the culture of a large target bank with that of the
acquirer.
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